

MEMORIES AND HORIZONS: THE LEGACY OF THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUALS IN EXILE AND THE «REUNIFICATION» OF EUROPE

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The fundamental aim of my paper is to shed light on the influence that Central and Eastern European intellectuals in the Exile, especially in London and Paris, had on the active promotion of plans and strategies to implement an eventual accession of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECS) to the European Communities. Through the use of a very determinate discourse and use of language, based in the so-called «Return to Europe» slogan, these movements created a sometimes noticeable impact in the media (thanks also to their links with Radio Free Europe) and triggered a fundamental historical development as the current Eastward enlargement of the European Union (EU), thus linking memories and horizons of the process of European integration.

To fully understand the meaning and implications of the «Return to Europe» slogan, used first by the CEECS and then by the EU to promote and justify Eastward Enlargement, from the nineties onwards, it is necessary to *clarify the roots of this discourse*.

In this sense, it is not surprising to observe that the origins of this slogan coincide with a period that could be characterised as a new historical chance or starting point, such as the post-Second World War period. It would be enough to allude to the title of the memoirs of the us Secretary of State Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*¹, to realize that such period was very much featured by the perception of an absolute new beginning from which the implementation of the most positive realities could be finally attainable. Nonetheless, the Cold War itself would reveal that those expectations of the new, definitive and absolute positive beginnings were nothing but an illusion.

Furthermore, and similar to what we will observe in the nineties, such perception of time allowed, however,

the development of very specific policies and arguments that would constitute an essential pillar of the constant renewal of the process of European integration.

I will first examine the contributions, efforts and arguments developed by Eastern European politicians and intellectuals in exile from their own point of view. Most of the documents refer to Polish figures and this is due to their pre-eminence in the available sources of that time. The consulted sources for this part of the chapter are mainly Papers of J. H. Retinger, from the Polish Library and Cultural Institute in London; The Raczyński Papers, from the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London; Papers of the Central European Federal Club in London; Consultive Assembly of the Council of Europe; Speeches from the Independent Central European Association in London, Commonwealth of Central Europe, the Assembly of Captive European Nations, Memorandums to NATO and the Central and East European Commissions both in London and Paris.

I include as sources also the articles written on this idea of «returning to Europe» published in specialised academic journals on both sides of the Atlantic from 1941 onwards. The main analysed journals are: *East European Politics and Societies*; *New Europe*; *Journal of Central European Affairs*; *The Eastern Quarterly*; *The Central European Federalist and Polish Affairs*.

On the other hand, I will also focus on the American dimension of the «Return to Europe» slogan promotion and on the plans and support of the European Movement to the mentioned exiles and its role on the diffusion of such argument, whose main sources are to be found in the Historical Archives of the European Communities in Florence (HAEC/ASCE).



First of all, it is interesting to observe how the initial plans for an Eastern European federalism were being gradually substituted by those upholding the unification of the whole continent, constituting the future bases of the «Return to Europe» slogan. These thoughts were spread through the articles wrote in specialised academic journals by the Eastern European exiles who escaped from their countries in the years of the Second World War and worked on the topic from both sides of the Atlantic².

Eastern European writers in exile commonly emphasised the independence of the East European states after the war, which could only be safeguarded through federalism. They reckoned that each Eastern European state in its own would be incapable of defending itself against the predatory powers both on the eastern and western side.

These were some of the ideas which were avidly discussed in the decade or so after the outbreak of the war. If these discussions seem fanciful in the context of Moscow's grip on East Central Europe, it is worth remembering that many of the *émigrés* were convinced that in the post war period circumstances would lead to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from their countries. Planning for the post-conflict world was therefore based on an optimistic assumption. Even when the hope of an immediate «return to Europe» was lost, the exiles still worked assiduously to strengthen links between East and West Europe, to remind the world that Europe was culturally indivisible, and to argue that the Iron Curtain was a completely artificial line which could not be sustained in the long term.

Events such as the death of Stalin, the Geneva discussions, the outrage in the West after the Hungarian rising and the Prague Spring, along with the split in the communist bloc all encouraged the *émigrés* to believe that there was a growing fluidity in the communist world which could not be contained forever.

There was a clear continuity between wartime planning meetings and the post-war movements for European unity. The role of Retinger in this transition should not be underestimated. He was ubiquitous, he knew everyone in leading political circles in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and the United States, and his energy, commitment and linguistic skills were outstanding. In his methods and networking he could be considered as an East European equivalent of Jean Monnet.

The *émigrés* supplied very many able and energetic men to advance the cause of European unity both by the fertility of their ideas and their energy in propagating them. But even more important was the leadership role that a number of them claimed, not only among the exiles, but even in the west European movement for a united Europe. Before his untimely death in 1943, Wladislaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile, was persuading many of the London governments-in-exile, from both eastern and western Europe, to begin discussions about the relations between the European states after the war.

He believed that unity would restore Europe's power and provide a framework within which Poland could find

a safe haven. He set out his vision in a speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in May 1946, and shortly afterwards contacted Paul van Zeeland in Brussels to seek his support in forming an organization to work for the unity of Europe. They agreed to cooperate first of all in the economic field owing to the disastrous economic situation in which Europe found itself. They jointly founded the Independent League for Economic Co-operation, one of the leading organizations represented at The Hague Congress in 1948 and one of the few to advocate close cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe for the economic benefit of the whole of the Continent.

At the Montreux conference in 1947, when the European Union of Federalists was formed, it was decided to organize a major congress in The Hague in May 1948 summoning the 'live forces' of Europe to discuss ways and means of achieving federation for the continent. The task of organizing this meeting was entrusted to a group called the International Committee of Movements for European Unity, the prime movers of which were Duncan Sandys, representing Churchill's non federalist United Europe Movement, and Retinger, who became its Secretary and its very energetic and accomplished organizer. Denis de Rougemont claimed, without exaggeration, that the The Hague congress held a central and decisive place in the evolution of a united Europe, and Retinger was at the heart of this process too.

Four results of the congress are especially worth noting:

First, the report of the Economic Commission chaired by Van Zeeland, was compiled by the League —then renamed the European League for Economic Cooperation—. It essentially called for both an economic and a monetary union for Europe, ideas fleshed out and implemented in the⁴ Treaties of Rome and Maastricht.

Retinger was actually more interested in cultural matters and was gratified by the decision to found a College of Europe at Bruges and a European Cultural Centre at Geneva under the leadership of de Rougemont and Salvador de Madariaga.

Second, the European Movement was born at The Hague. It evolved out of the *ad hoc* International Committee, and Retinger became its Secretary-General. Its mission was to inform and lead public opinion, to promote a sense of European consciousness, and to provide a medium through which supporters of this cause could make their influence felt. It insisted that it would work for the unity and freedom of the whole of Europe, not just the western part.

Third, the Council of Europe was established as a result of the impetus given to European unity by The Hague congress. This was a more significant move than it seemed later, when the Council was marginalized from the main movements for European unity. But, at its inception

in 1949, great hopes were lavished on it as the driving force for a united Europe.

Finally, the Congress permitted representatives of the East European exile communities to take their seats in the conference hall.

In retrospect, the Congress of Europe constituted a major turning point in the movement for European unity, and among its leadership and its ardent supporters were prominent East Central Europeans. In its early years, the European Movement provided an institutional link between federalists from both parts of Europe. This was achieved as a result of pressure from East European exiles and West European sympathisers. Retinger, as Secretary-General, played an important facilitating role in the establishment of what was called the Central and East European Commission of the Movement. Composed of representatives from East European *émigré* communities and prominent western politicians, such as Harold MacMillan, Richard Law and Belgian Senator E. de la Vallée Poussin, its secretary for most of its existence was John Pomian, a *protégé* of Retinger, and an energetic promoter and organizer.

Despite these initiatives, the Council of Europe seemed to disappoint the hopes the East European since, although it was supposed to represent all of Europe, it failed to represent the Eastern part effectively. The Assembly and the member governments would not agree to seat representatives from the *émigré* communities. Neither would they agree to the proposal to keep empty chairs, symbolising that places were waiting for representatives of East European states when they became democratic.

An Inter-University Federal Union also enjoyed a brief life. A more specifically Polish organization, the Union of Polish Federalists (UPF), was created in 1949 by federalists from Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland. It intended to coordinate various Polish federalist activities and to propagate its ideas to European federalist organizations. Appropriately it became a member of the European Union of Federalists. Rowmund Pilsudski who had led the organization Movement for Liberty 'Independence and Democracy' founded immediately after the Yalta conference, became the president of the Union and a member of the Central and East European Commission of the European Movement. Like the other Eastern federalist organizations at this time, it supported a number of regional unions for Europe, especially after the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), owing to the diversity of interests in the different geographical areas of Europe. The UPF attracted much support from the Polish communities in exile and the majority of the *émigré* Polish political parties endorsed its programme.

The «Independence and Democracy» movement opposed De Gaulle's «Europe des Patries», proposing

instead «the Europe of the Peoples», governed by the European Parliament elected directly by citizens of the constituent states and deciding policy by majority votes. In this respect it could be said to have identified the «democratic deficit» at an early stage⁵.

On the other hand, it should be emphasised that it was the East Europeans who were most conscious of the narrowing horizons of both the Council of Europe and the European Movement. It was also the *émigrés*, through their federalist organizations, who remained most loyal to the original vision of the Council's founders. They felt impelled to remind the Council and the Movement of the founding fathers' conviction that Europe in the political, economic and cultural senses, formed one whole, and that the role of the Council was to represent the interests of all of Europe and to bring about the continent's unification.

Aleksander Bregman, a leading Polish *émigré* journalist, urged that the Council of Europe should live up to its pretensions, even if its actions in support of East Central Europe were mainly symbolic⁶. Similar criticisms were levelled at the European Movement itself. On the one hand its professions of faith united West and East Europeans in a common cause. «It is our unshakeable conviction» —resolved the Westminster conference of the Movement in 1952— «that no real peace is possible which accepts the present division of Europe ... To speak of lasting peace while a hundred million Europeans groan in bondage is a mockery»⁷.

The following year the Movement resolved to help by all peaceful means the peoples under Soviet domination to recover their independence and freedom. A new campaign of the European Movement would stress its duty to inform and lead public opinion, to promote a sense of European consciousness and a common loyalty to Europe, and to provide the means by which supporters of the cause could make their influence felt. In short, the European Movement pledged itself to work for the unity and freedom of all of Europe, and, as far as possible, to associate the peoples of Eastern Europe with its campaign.

The tendency of the Movement to identify Europe with the Europe of the Six and to look at problems from an EEC standpoint was criticised in 1962 by John Pomian, Secretary of the Central and East European Commission of the Movement. A memorandum from the Movement on an eventual enlargement, he pointed out, did not mention the East European states; remarkably it argued that the «final objective» of the Movement was the organization of a new power in the West. Of course, in the eyes of the exiles, this completely ignored the historical, cultural and geographical unity of Europe, the aspirations of the peoples of the East, and the Movement's own *raison d'être*.

On the other hand, the Movement failed to live up to its ideals, in the view of its East European critics. Even Retinger, who was its Secretary-General, was accused it

in the early 1950s of betraying its principles by neglecting Europe as a whole in favour of the Europe of the Six, as embodied in the ECSC and the EDC.

Pomian went on to argue that the evolution of the communist bloc and the growing strength of Western Europe favoured a policy aiming at the cultural reunion of the whole of Europe.

The EEC —the new power in the West— he concluded, should avoid all actions which might harden the existing divisions. Simply talking of an Open Door did little to encourage the peoples of the East to believe that the West had not abandoned them. Contacts should be intensified on the conviction «that the fraternity of the European peoples is older and stronger than the political incompatibility between the states»⁸.

However, the new Statutes of the European Movement in 1967 downgraded the National Committees of the East Central European peoples in exile from members to 'associate members', implying that a lower priority would be given to the unity of the whole of Europe even than before⁹. A year later, in 1968, Walter Hallstein, the former head of the European Commission and at that time President of the Movement, spoke at length to a meeting of the Movement but made minimal reference to East Central Europe. Although he emphasised the need to deepen the EEC in order to make it more attractive, his timescale was exceedingly leisurely, not considering an all-European meeting earlier than the mid 1980s¹⁰.

In its 1971 meeting the European Movement had «completely forgotten», in Raczynski's words, the countries behind the Iron Curtain. «What was the point of the Movement», Raczynski asked Hallstein «if it does not see itself at the head of the campaign for European unity?»¹¹. The «fear of provoking the ill humour of the communist regimes, he added, should not constitute the dominant motive for the Movement». «Our nations —he concluded— listen for words of encouragement in the struggle for a common ideal»¹². He might have reminded Hallstein of the words of Duncan Sandys in 1949, that the Movement, as an unofficial and independent organization, was not obliged to show the same caution as governments in dealing with the totalitarian countries. On the contrary, it had a duty «ceaselessly to proclaim our determination to see all the peoples of Europe united in freedom»¹³. Clearly this determination had been fatally weakened in the subsequent two decades.

In addition, the debate which took place in the 1950s and 1960s about the reunification of Germany and its possible neutralisation gave the *émigrés* the chance to question the inconsistency in considering the German problem as a matter of practical policy while relegating the problem of the «captive nations» to the realm of declarations and pious wishes. Talk of the unification of the two Germanys should be complemented by discussions on the unification of the two Europes¹⁴.

Meanwhile, the main discussions revolved around these questions: What should the West do, and more particularly, what should the European Movement do, to foster unity in Europe? The Commission tried to answer this question in 1957. It assumed that the recovery of independence and democracy in the East would automatically result in the establishment of confederations or federations, leading ultimately to the unification of the whole of Europe. Hence it proposed the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the granting of economic aid to the states of East Central Europe, and the support of all social forces striving for independence.

Above all, some of the most demanded measures, which fell within the ambit of the European Movement, were to widen the scope of human and cultural intercourse between the free and the communist worlds by more effective cultural exchanges, the provision of university scholarships in the West, the promotion of student exchanges and cultural visits, the exchange of teachers, and the enhancement of tourism¹⁵.

The American dimension of the «Return to Europe» slogan during the Cold War

After having dealt with the contribution made by Eastern European politicians and intellectuals in exile to the development of the idea of East-West European unity during the years of the Cold War, I would like to concentrate in another very influential factor for the consolidation of such expectation. And that is the dimension of the American influence on the potentialities of implementing this idea, whose defence or refusal is also linked to inner changes in the American perception of the cold-war bipolar landscape.

First of all, it is important to take into account that, as Winand reminds us, «during the Cold War, European integration became one of the main elements of American strategy for strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. By providing stability and prosperity for the West, European integration also held the prospect of one day opening the door negotiations with the Soviet Union from a position



of strength, which in turn might mean the end of the artificial division of Europe into East and West»¹⁶.

Furthermore, there were other realms apart from the geopolitical and the military one in which the allusions to the idea of European unity idea become abundant.

One example could be the project of Truman of building «a commercial organisation that includes the totality of Europe, thanks to the expected opening of fluvial channels that would permit the gathering of the

agricultural resources in Central and Eastern Europe. From these regions the agricultural products would go to the industrial regions of Western Europe»¹⁷.

Soon after that there was a division in the Truman administration on the question of co operating or not with the Russians in the reconstruction of Europe. «Convinced that a drifting apart of Western and Eastern Europe would breed instability in Europe, some junior officers in the us missions and embassies abroad and in the State



Department made plans for an all-European economic and political settlement with supranational institutions»¹⁸. But these prospects dimmed as the possibility of organising peace and recovery in Europe along with the Russians showed to be more and more unlikely.

American offer to Eastern Europe to participate in the Marshall Plan was refused by the Soviet Union but the Americans were very cautious to include the Soviet Union a priori in the plan. This was done also not to be accused of the eventual division of Europe, taking

into account that the plan was beforehand not bound to be accepted by the USSR.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union, fearing that participation in the plan would draw Eastern European countries within the orbit of the United States and eventually encircle the Soviet Union with capitalist countries, and strongly opposed to the reconstruction of Germany's economy, «Moscow ended up assuming the responsibility for the division of Europe»¹⁹.

Then, the Truman administration «abandoned hopes for Pan-European unification schemes based on East-West cooperation, at least for the short term and concentrated their efforts on Western Europe»²⁰.

In the sixties, Kennedy considered the role of trade in the potential progressive detachment of Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union.

Johnson continued in this way through the Miller Committee, created to study the increasing East-West trade relationships. It was also thought by American officials at that time that «the stability and prosperity that followed economic integration in Western Europe has created new aspirations and stimulated new thinking in Eastern Europe. It was by capitalising on these aspirations that they hoped to draw Western and Eastern Europe together»²¹.

Also Geroge Ball, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966, formulated a very specific conception of a European peace settlement to which Eastern European states, including the GDR, would adhere to or would be absorbed into «some kind of Western unity» and this would be more bound to happen if Western Europe remained in close partnership with the us.

The same assumptions underlay President Johnson's speech *Making Europe Whole: An unfinished task*. There he elaborates the Kennedy's partnership among equals idea and at the same time states the «need to move more confidently in peaceful initiatives towards the East and to provide a framework within which a unified Germany could be a full partner without arousing ancient fears».

A closer look on the contents of the «Return to Europe» slogan as developed within the European Movement during the Cold War

It is now time to turn to the analysis of the contents of the «Return to Europe» slogan by specifically studying its development within the European Movement on behalf of Eastern European politicians and intellectuals in exile.

The discourse of the «Return to Europe» slogan gained special strength between the years 1949 and 1952, and it is the fruit of the conclusions of the meetings of those Eastern European intellectuals in the exile living in London or Paris, who were members of the European Movement, where they acted as representatives of their



respective countries as part of the Central and Eastern European Section of the European Movement.

As mentioned above, in December 1946, in Paris, Henri Brugmans, who will years later become the Principal of the College of Europe, promoted the creation of the European Union of Federalists and declared in the first conference of the European Union of Federalists, celebrated in Montreaux in 1947 that «the fact of not being able to have the collaboration of the CEECS, dominated by the Soviet Union is an enormous tragedy. We will have to start the process of integration of the Old Continent without the CEECS, but I hope we will be able to integrate them as soon as the political circumstances will permit it».

Therefore, he decided to create a Central and Eastern European Section of the European Movement to give voice to those Eastern European Intellectuals in exile who have left their countries very early at the beginning of the soviet domination. The actual implementation of this integrating will was the creation of the Section of Studies about the CEECS in Strasbourg in 1949, to support the so-called «captive nations»²³ that will hopefully soon return to Europe, «to end up with an unnatural division in order to converge in the common European culture and heritage»²⁴.

As previously commented, these intellectuals²⁵ reacted, in the first moments of the Cold War, to the impression of their countries being kidnapped and deprived from their signs of identity, which they regarded as part of the Western European mainstream²⁶.

Since that founding moment, the Eastern European intellectuals in exile were developing, within the mentioned international meetings, very concrete plans to eventually leave the Soviet sphere and be linked to Western Europe.

Between those plans, we can find ideas which really fill the EU contemporary agenda, like the creation of a European citizenship and a European Convention of Human Rights, with special care for political exiles, immigrants and refugees. The members of the European Movement established in 1950 some very specific points for the eventual re-joining of Europe which sound surprisingly familiar and are not very well-known.

It is also significant to remark other kind of initiatives of these intellectuals like the creation of the radio station «Radio Free Europe», about which they said that «the radio programmes launched to the CEECS should be dedicated to cultural aspects rather than to political controversies. This initiative should be accompanied by the energetic protest of the intellectuals from free countries against the generalised attacks to the freedom of consciousness and word in the countries beyond the Iron Curtain»²⁷.

Despite all these outcries, and, as Pérez Sánchez has affirmed, «after the revisionist fallacy of 1953 and the military intervention in Hungary in 1956, the status quo of the

bipolar division established after the Second World War was perpetuated till the beginning of the nineties when the question of *returning to Europe* was opened again»²⁸.

As Jean Monnet stated then «we still have long decades of separation imposed by force to those who want to live together»²⁹, but the «Return to Europe» slogan remained in latent life, constituting, since the beginning of the nineties, a fundamental way of convergence between the recovered past and the hoped future in post-communist societies, but, also, soon, at the level of the European Union.

As we can observe in the initiatives described above, those proposals sound really near to the events of our present and there is a very precise explanation for that. Most politicians of the CEECS, who were making an effort, at the beginning of the transition, to transform the «Return to Europe» slogan into a reality, have recovered all the ideas of those Eastern intellectuals in the exile and used them to elaborate their political programmes.

This channelling of ideas and concepts today inherited by the language articulating the justifications of the Eastward enlargement of the EU has, as we could observe, its basis in the very specific nature and developments of the Cold War period.

The long division of the continent, noted by representatives of the CEECS, by American politicians and by western Europeanists came to constitute the key element to claim accession to the EU by the CEECS new elites.

In this sense, the «Return to Europe» slogan can be a discursive manipulation, a fair come to terms with history or a new instrument to counterbalance EU conditionality.

However, its main feature is the use of history and time perceptions as the main elements to succeed in the search of a new self-definition once the previous order gave way to the illusive landscape of possibility.

NOTAS

¹ D. ACHESON (1969), *Present at the Creation*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.

² See, for instance, R. MICHALOWSKI, «Elements of Security in Eastern Europe». *New Europe*, vol. 1, nº 8, July 1941; R. MICHALOWSKI, «Eastern's Europe Security: More thoughts». *New Europe*, vol. 1, nº 11, October 1941; W. KULSKI, «Poland and Central Europe». *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. 2, nº 4, January 1943; W. R. MALINOWSKI, «Towards a Polish Soviet Understanding». *New Europe*, Supplement November 1943; F. GROSS, «United Europe or "Spheres of Influence"?». *New Europe*, vol. 4, nº 10, December 1944; F. HONTI, «The problem of the Independence of the Countries of East Central Europe». *The Eastern Quarterly*, vol. 4, nº 2, April 1951.

³ J. POMIAN (ed.) (1972), *Joseph Retinger: Memoirs of an Eminence Grise*. London: Sussex University Press, p. 109. For a closer look to the Independent League of Economic Cooperation see also M. DUMOULIN, «Les débuts de la Ligue européenne de

Cooperation économique (1946-1949)». *Res Publica*, n° 1, 1987, pp. 102-103; T. GROSBOIS, «L'action de Józef Retinger en faveur de l'idée européenne 1940-46». *European Review of History*, vol. 6, n° 1, 1999, pp. 79-81. Members of the League included many well known or up and coming political figures in Western Europe such as Spaak, Kerstens, Cripps, MacMillan, Thorneycroft, Hore Belisha, Michel Debré and the young Giscard d'Estaing. They were joined by Adolf Berle and John Foster Dulles from the United States, where Retinger went on a recruiting visit and was able to acquire some financial support from the State Department.

⁴ M. DUMOULIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105; T. GROSBOIS, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-81.

⁵ References to a «democratic deficit» notion can be found in: PWS, «Poles and Federalism», p. 15; «Central Council of the Union of Polish Federalists», *The Central European Federalist*, vol. 1, n° 1, April 1953, p. 223; «Regional Unions». *Polish Affairs*, vol. 2, n° 1, January 1953, p. 17; PISM, Starzewski papers, Kol. 357/13, the object of federal clubs, p. 34; PISM, Kol 415/4 European Study Bureau, Central European Federal Movement Conference, London, 2629 May 1950, p. 12.

⁶ PISM, Raczynski papers, Kol 23/H/214, Raczynski to MacMillan, 22 June 1950, and Central and East European Commission, minutes 13 June 1950; Kol 23/H/215, «An Eastern European Policy», draft comments by Raczynski.

⁷ Cited in: PISM, Raczynski papers, Kol 23/H/220, «Europe does not end at the Iron Curtain», p. 8; PLCI Retinger papers, European Movement, 1280/Rps, Box 12, File 8, «The Story of the Campaign», p. 67; *Daily Telegraph*, 26 October, 1948.

⁸ PISM, Raczynski papers, 23/H/220, letter from John Pomian, 7 November 1962 and 23/H/227, Brussels conference of the Central and East European Commission, 10 January 1964.

⁹ PISM, Raczynski papers, Kol. 23/H/229, Conference at Bad Godesberg, 21-22 April 1967.

¹⁰ PISM, Raczynski papers, Kol. 23/H/231, Speech of Walter Hallstein to the Federal Council of the European Movement, 20 January 1968.

¹¹ PISM, Raczynski papers, Kol. 23/H/234, Letter from Raczynski to Hallstein, 29 April 1971.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ PISM, International Committee of the Movements for European Unity, Kol 133/216, speech by Duncan Sandys, 25 February 1949.

¹⁴ For references to the link between the reunification of the two Germanies and that of the two Europes, please see PLCI, Retinger papers, 1280/Rps European Unity, Box II, File 4, Background paper n.d. and 1280/Rps Box X, File 8, memorandum of Paul Auer, April 1954; PISM, Raczynski papers Kol 23/H/246, Assembly of Captive European Nations, Memo to NATO, 16 December 1957.

¹⁵ PLCI, Retinger papers, 1280/Rps Box X, File 8, Resolutions of the Central and East European Commission, 1 July 1957; Retinger papers, 1280/RPS European Unity, Box II, File 4, Central and East European Commission, Note on Cultural Exchanges, 29 May 1962.

¹⁶ P. WINAND (1993), *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. x.

¹⁷ G. BOSSUAT (1994), *Les fondateurs de l'Europe*. Paris: Belin Sup Histoire, p. 133.

¹⁸ P. WINAND, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁹ P. WINAND, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²⁰ P. WINAND, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

²¹ P. WINAND, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

²² Address by President Johnson to the National Conference of Editorial Writers in New York. 7 October 1966. Department of State Bulletin. 24 October 1966, p. 624. Quoted in P. Winand, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

²³ This term firstly appeared in 'Mouvement Européen. Section Pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale', «Notes sommaires sur la réunion constitutive de la Section d'Études des Pays de l'Est. Strasbourg, le 17 Août 1949». ME875 (ASCE: Archivi Storici delle Comunità Europee).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ To see the complete lists with the names and surnames, country by country, of all these intellectuals, who acted as representatives of Central and Eastern Europe in the Meetings of the European Movement both in London and Paris, please refer to the following Minutes of the Meetings of the Eastern and Central European Section of the European Movement, to be found at the Historical Archives of the European Communities in Florence (ASCE). I quote all the consulted Minutes in chronological order: «Mouvement Européen. Section des Pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale», «Procès Verbal. La première réunion de la Section des Pays de l'Est du Mouvement Européen, le 25 Août, 1949»; «Eastern and Central European Section. Minutes. Meeting held on March 30th, 1950»; «Mouvement Européen. Section des Pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale», «Réunion du 8 Mai, 1950»; «Mouvement Européen. Commission d'Études Politiques: Section des Pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale», «Procès Verbal de la réunion du 13 Juin, 1950»; «Mouvement Européen. Commission d'Études Politiques: Section des Pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale», «Procès Verbal de la réunion du 17 Juin, 1950»; «Minutes of a Meeting of Central and Eastern European Section held on 27th June, 1950»; «Mouvement Européen. Commission d'Études Politiques: Section des Pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale», «Procès Verbal de la réunion du 26 Juillet, 1950»; «Central and Eastern European Commission. Meeting of the Bureau, 29th June, 1951»; «Mouvement Européen. Commission d'Études Politiques: Section des Pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale», «Procès Verbal de la réunion du 15 Juillet, 1951»; «Mouvement Européen. Commission d'Études Politiques: Section des Pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale», «Procès Verbal de la réunion du 25 Septembre, 1951»; «European Movement. Central and Eastern European Commission. Minutes: Meeting of the Bureau, 7th January, 1952»; «European Movement. Central and Eastern European Commission, Conference on Central and Eastern Europe: Resolutions (20th-24th January, 1952, Church House, London)», 27 pp., ARCHIV. HADOC.2027; «Mouvement Européen. Commission de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale», «Compte rendu de la réunion du Bureau: 10, Septembre, 1952». All in ME 875 (ASCE: Archivi Storici delle Comunità Europee).

²⁶ Such consideration has been largely studied by Edgar Morin in E. MORIN (1994), *Pensar Europa*. Barcelona: Gedisa, p. 58.

²⁷ «Mouvement Européen. Commission de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale», «Compte rendu de la réunion du Bureau: 10, Septembre, 1952» in ME 875 (ASCE).

²⁸ G. PÉREZ SÁNCHEZ y R. MARTÍN DE LA GUARDIA (2002), *Estudios sobre la Europa Oriental*. Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, pp. 285-286.

²⁹ J. MONNET (1985), *Memorias*. Madrid: Siglo XXI, p. 262.

RESUMEN

Memorias y Horizontes. El legado de los intelectuales del centro y este de Europa en el exilio y la «reunificación» de Europa

El objetivo fundamental de este estudio consiste en ilustrar el legado de los intelectuales proeuropeos provenientes del Centro y Este de Europa en el exilio durante la guerra fría y dar a conocer su promoción activa de planes y estrategias para implementar una eventual adhesión de los Países del Centro y Este de Europa (PECOS) a las incipientes Comunidades Europeas. A través de un discurso muy específico, basado en el denominado eslogan del «Retorno a Europa», estos intelectuales lograron un notable impacto en los medios de comunicación (a través de iniciativas

como «Radio Free Europe», etc.) y sentaron las bases teóricas de la futura ampliación de la Unión Europea hacia el Este, que ha sido frecuentemente interpretada como una «reunificación» del continente.

De hecho, entre sus textos e iniciativas es posible encontrar ideas que han tenido un gran peso ético y político en nuestro futuro reciente, tales como la creación de una ciudadanía común europea, una Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos que prestase una especial atención a exiliados políticos, inmigrantes y refugiados, etc. El presente estudio tiene, asimismo, por finalidad, el desvelar el hilo conductor entre los textos elaborados por dichos intelectuales y su recuperación por parte de las nuevas élites de los PECOS desde la década de los noventa con el fin de utilizar sus argumentos y análisis como preparación de los esfuerzos políticos y económicos que el proceso de ampliación implica, uniendo así, memorias y horizontes en el espacio de una ruptura temporal.

Las fuentes principales consultadas para la elaboración de este proyecto son las siguientes: los *Papers of J. H. Retinger*; los *Raczynski Papers* de la Polish Library and Cultural Institute en Londres; los *Papers of the Central European Federal Club* en Londres; los documentos preservados en la Consultive Assembly of the Council of Europe, así como los discursos y actas procedentes de los Historical Archives of the European Communities en Florencia (HAEC/ASCE).

